The Attack on Iran — Why Now? | TED Explains the World with Ian Bremmer

This morning, after weeks of escalating threats,

the United States and Israel bombed several parts of Iran,

including the supreme leader Ali Khamenei's compound in Tehran.

Iran responded in kind with missiles launched towards Israel

and four Gulf Arab countries

which host US military bases,

Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE.

Now, this is a fast-moving situation which feels extraordinarily tenuous,

so we obviously returned immediately to Eurasia Group's founder Ian Bremmer to help us

make sense of what is happening now

and what is to come.

Ian, hi.

Helen, good to see you as always.

So, Ian, as I mentioned, the threats have been stacking up for weeks now,

so this escalation isn't exactly a surprise,

but tell us why Trump is doing this now.

Well, um there are a couple of reasons.

First, there is a level of confidence

that Trump has uh both on the back of his uh success in Venezuela

having uh removed Nicolas Maduro,

not assassinated him, actually bringing him to justice,

though a lot of Venezuelans and Cubans were killed in the operation.

No Americans were.

It's gone over well.

Uh the Americans find it popular.

Uh most of the Latin American countries find it popular, and you know,

he's like, well, I can do this in other places, too.

Uh so, part of it is that.

Pa- part of it is that he's had experience with Iran before, military experience.

Uh after withdrawing from the Iranian nuclear deal, the JCPOA, in his first term,

he's put the Iranians on notice on a couple of occasions,

and when he is engaged in military strikes against Iran,

the Iranians have not been able or willing to hit him back.

Uh and so, he he doesn't feel like he there's a deterrent capability here,

so he's not taking a particularly big risk.

Um finally, uh he did engage in negotiations,

but his demands were much greater than the Iranians were willing to engage

and that's been clear for months now frankly.

Uh but he did want to ensure

that there was adequate military capabilities in the region both in terms of the

strikes that the Americans were going to engage in

that we're now seeing the beginning of

but also in terms of America's ability to help defend Israel

and its own bases

and its allies across the region.

Um that final the final components of

that only got into place days ago

and then this was the first window of opportunity um after

that when the Americans

and Israelis had a clean shot at the supreme leader

and the top military leadership um

and they gave the order.

So that's that's you know what precipitated all of this.

There's a broader question about you know how do we feel about the United

States exercising unilateral military power all over the world um engaging in a policy

of regime change assassinating political leaders.

What does that mean going forward for the US?

What does it mean for other countries around the world?

But but in terms of what what led to this series of strikes um

this did not certainly did not surprise us.

I don't think it was a big surprise to the markets.

The scale of the military strikes were greater than were generally anticipated

but nobody nobody credible following this believed

that the negotiations were heading for breakthrough nor did they believe

that this was a taco moment

that Trump was going to chicken out.

Uh they they did feel

and we did feel um

that he was going to make good

as it were on his threats

as were the Israelis

and they've been coordinating on this very closely for a couple of months now.

So, as you know,

Trump just announced a few minutes ago on Truth Social that Khamenei is dead.

Is like what happens now?

That feels huge.

I I think it is a big deal.

Um and I mean there are a few things to say about it.

The first is that let us remember that this is an incredibly brutal regime.

And that Khamenei has uh not only been personally responsible uh for the brutality

of the regime,

but also has been a hardliner in terms of refusing effective negotiations with the

Americans uh over the past months.

Um I mean certainly many thousands of Iranian civilians

and and believed tens of thousands of Iranian civilians were killed uh under the

order of Khamenei um in January

when they were demonstrating.

And most of these were unarmed

and not posing a direct security threat um to the troops

that they were facing off against.

And that is frankly we haven't seen

that kind of short-term brutality um in the region uh anywhere.

Uh you'd have to look to Sudan.

You'd have to look to Rwanda before you saw that kind of killing.

You're talking about the sort of death deaths over the course of a couple

weeks that you saw in Gaza over an entire year of fighting.

So, that's that's really an extraordinary um brutality.

And and as a consequence there aren't a lot of people

that are going to um shed a tear over the death of Khamenei.

Um having said that, um he is not the regime.

He's 86 years old.

They've been planning for transition for a long time.

The fact that he has been killed will make him seem to be more

of a martyr in the eyes certainly of those

that support the regime inside Iran,

of whom there are many,

a minimum of probably 15

and 20% of the population

that are hardened regime supporters

and will become more

so on the back of this assassination.

Um, the Iranian military leadership has taken substantial strikes over the 12-day war last

year and they reconstituted themselves quite quickly.

It didn't affect their ability and willingness to repress internally.

It It does appear

that a number of other military leaders may well be dead.

Um, probably not the president, um, but others.

The president's not a very important figure, frankly,

in the eyes of the Iranian people or in driving power,

but the head of the IRGC may well be dead.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The Israelis have announced

that he has been killed

as well as other top advisers to the supreme leader on the military side,

but it's it's very far to go from

that to it's the end of the regime.

Because remember, when Trump launched these strikes with the Israelis, he said,

"We're attacking all of the military installations."

And they've certainly done that.

They're attacking all the ballistic missile installations

that they can find

that that they can get to.

They're certainly doing that.

Um, but he also said this is meant to be an operation of regime

change.

He said, "Now that we're taking out the leadership,

it is your once-in-a-generation opportunity, the Iranian people,

to take your government."

But taking the government requires overthrowing those members of the IRGC, the military,

the Basij, the paramilitary groups, um, the the police officers on the streets, um,

and others that have been very willing

and capable of using lethal force against the Iranian civilians.

And there's no reason to believe that that's about to change.

It It might.

We can hope that it's about to change, but there's no reason yet.

There's no evidence that makes us believe that.

And there's certainly no American boots on the ground.

Uh, there are no Israeli boots on the ground.

There's no coordinated opposition with leadership the way there has been in Venezuela,

for example.

So, I mean, on the one hand, in Venezuela,

Trump was fully prepared to continue to work with the same regime having removed

Maduro.

And that has so far proven to be a pretty effective short-term strategy,

at least.

But in Iran, Trump isn't prepared to work with the existing regime,

and understandably in many ways.

But it's not clear how we get from

that to the government of the people,

which would be an extraordinary thing for Iran

and for the entire region

and for the world.

Uh, but but some someone's got to actually make that happen.

And for now, as of today,

it it would be it'd be quite a stretch to say

that the Iranian people have the capacity to do

that.

So, Reza Pahlavi, who is, of course, the son of the of the Shah,

has said that he's willing to come back from exile.

How realistic do you think that is?

Uh, I mean, with sufficient support, um, I mean, policing around him, um,

it is perhaps plausible, um, that he could be there,

and he could set up camp someplace.

Um, I think it's plausible.

It's not today, but it's perhaps plausible.

But that requires some level of intervention, right?

I I it's not as if you're able to right now, um,

fly in friendlies, um,

and you're going to be welcomed at the Tehran International Airport.

Like, that that's not a thing.

Um, and and again, I mean, Trump has been very careful.

Everyone is talking about how Trump is a hawk

and Trump is a hardliner

and he's willing to use military force.

And clearly, there are lots of countries

that have been on the wrong side of uh American bombs

and missiles over the last year,

just as they have in the Biden administration,

as they have in the in in previous administrations.

But but Trump does not want American troops getting killed.

He doesn't want forever wars.

Remember, he brought the war in Afghanistan after some 20 years to an end.

Uh Biden concluded it, um,

but it was Trump

that that took a deal with the Taliban

that in many ways was one-sided

because he just wanted the American troops out.

And so, Trump is going to continue to be extremely reluctant to commit any

American forces on the ground.

Um, and absent that, uh, we are pretty far, at least, again,

as of today, from a place that you would say,

I predict that this regime is over

and the shock can come back

and uh the Iranians can have democratic elections

and they can actually put in place a regime

that would represent them.

We're we're very far from that.

Now, there's still going to be a lot of military attacks

and the Americans uh expect this to go on probably for a matter of

several days to a little over a week in terms of destroying all of

Iran's naval capabilities,

um, extinguishing, uh, their UAV, um,

the unarmed aerial vehicles and and their missile uh capabilities.

Uh it is possible

that they've already fired off a lot of what they still have.

But but if they haven't within a week that that capacity will be done.

And so you know,

I think it is it is plausible

that in very short order Iran will no longer have direct capacity to threaten

other regimes in the region.

They may have asymmetric capabilities through proxies.

They could certainly fund terrorist activities, that sort of thing.

They could engage in espionage.

But but conventional military activities,

we are nearing the end of Iran's capacity to project power.

And that's a big deal.

But that's very very different Ellen from saying

that Iran won't have the capacity to repress their people on the ground.

That that is not something

that the Americans right now have a military plan for.

And and it is Right now there's no reason to believe there's no evidence

that would show that the Iranian regime is going to be incapable of continuing

to repress absent such a plan.

I have so many follow-up questions to that.

But one I guess is who do you see emerging

then as a leader

or is it just too early to say given the chaos

that is happening on the ground in Iran.

And I guess the other question is what's the plan for tomorrow?

Or what's the plan for after the strikes stop for the Iranian people?

Like what does Trump does Trump care about that?

Or like it just seems like this is all happening

and there is actually no plan for for for the people on the ground

which >> So two different questions.

As of right now your expectation would be

that the IRGC will still be in charge.

A number of their top leaders will be killed.

There will be new leaders that will come and replace them.

We have seen that with Hezbollah with complete decapitation by Israel over the last

year,

the Patriot attacks and all of that, and they have refilled their ranks, right?

And they are nowhere near as capable as they used to be.

They don't pose a significant threat to Israel today,

but they still have a lot of capacity to govern on the ground in

southern Lebanon,

and the Lebanese government and army has been incapable {slash} unwilling to disarm them,

which is why the ceasefire is has been hard to maintain.

So, that that's what you would expect to see right now.

Now, that recognizes that it's going to be very hard for them to communicate

with each other for the near term.

It might be hard for them to actually have orders

that are given in a centralized way

that are then followed out across the country,

but still for now, that's what we're looking at.

And that's kind of the way the country has been run for the past

years.

So, this is not this is not a regime

that is new to figuring out how to effectively repress its people domestically.

And and so that's >> see and do you and sorry to interrupt you,

but do you see So, given that state,

so you don't see the IRGC actually kind of falling apart.

You think that that will kind of mean they'll maintain their their power.

They're not organized.

Obviously, there's a total disarray happening in the country,

but the IRGC will actually stick together

as a unit and will continue to run the country.

Is it too early to imagine

that you might see kind of democratic leaders emerging from within the like the

organization on the ground in Iran?

I know that there are many leaders who've been put into prison.

Do you think they would get out?

Like what do you >> Yeah, this all of this is too soon.

I hope I am wrong.

It is too early for me to be saying the IRGC is going to

be in charge of this country in three months' time.

It is too early to say that.

I am responding to your question saying right now who do I expect is

in charge?

That's right now.

That is less than 24 hours after these strikes have begun.

It is still the IRGC.

There are many things that could change over time.

Um and there's very little information on the ground.

But the key point here is

that unlike in Venezuela where the Americans had active ongoing engagement with senior leaders

that they were prepared to work with after taking Maduro out.

They do not have that in Iran.

They have tried.

They have gotten some support from some IRGC members who have given them information

and intelligence on the whereabouts of the supreme leader

and other senior leaders in Iran.

That has been helpful in in getting them the success

that they have just seen um in these strikes.

So it's not like they haven't engaged in intelligence collection,

but what they don't have is a group inside the government

that they're prepared to work with

and and the opposition at this point is very fragmented.

Um doesn't really exist on the ground in an organized way at all even

though most people oppose the regime.

So then your other question, what does Trump do?

What you know, what does this mean?

Well, Trump has a series of goals.

And and think about the way he's presented them

because he wants this to be a big win.

Um one goal is the destruction of Iran's nuclear capabilities.

He did a fair amount of that last year.

He said they were obliterated.

Some of them were,

but not all of them

and they rebuilt as quickly

as they could without oversight from the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors.

Um so there's that.

Um the ballistic missiles the Iranians were refused to even negotiate on.

A A of those have now been blown up

and those that haven't a lot of been a lot of them have been

launched um against Israel,

but also against Gulf states and yes, they do host American military bases,

but most of the strikes

that we've seen so far have actually been against civilian targets in those countries

like in Dubai,

like in Riyadh, which does not actually host any American bases itself.

Those bases are far outside.

Um and and so the ballistic missiles are no longer the threat

that they used to be.

So you already have two of the three goals

that Trump announced um in his uh decision to go ahead uh with a

war against Iran that Trump can say I've already achieved

and I will have achieved by the time these military operations have concluded.

I will have achieved those goals.

Now the third goal, which is regime change, he's given himself an out.

He said, "Okay, I've I've done all of these strikes

and right now it's too dangerous

because I'm still going to hit

and Israel is still going to hit all these military

and leadership targets,

but once we're done, Iranian people take it over."

And if they don't, then he'll say, "Well, I I did everything I could.

I gave them the opportunity.

They didn't do it."

Does Does he want to say that?

He doesn't want to say that,

but but he's not going to take responsibility for this himself

because he is not intending to engage in the direct regime change himself.

He's already said in the initial hours of these operations

that the the actors

that will engage in changing the regime will be the Iranian people.

He has no control over the Iranian people.

He has no influence over the Iranian people.

A lot of the Iranian people don't particularly trust him.

He said he was going to rescue the Iranian people

and tens of thousands of Iranians died after he said

that he was going to rescue them.

And and it was, you know,

over a month later before he took military action.

So, I mean, I think that if you're an Iranian citizen today, you know,

you're you're feeling pretty squeezed.

You're not necessarily feeling like there are great opportunities in front of you in

any circumstance,

and it's going to be very dangerous what you decide to do going forward.

Again, my my hope is that this regime collapses with a minimum of violence.

I think that's everyone's hope.

It's everyone's hope.

Whether you supported the US attacks or you didn't,

everyone hopes that the Iranian people can have a government

that actually respects and reflects their values,

their rights, um their their their hopes and aspirations.

But, we are very far from that,

and the United States may have facilitated that to a degree,

but they certainly are not causing it.

Um and and again, we're very far from here to there.

Right.

There is a very long way to go.

I am curious, and this is probably a really stupid question, so you're welcome.

But, why did Iran Why have they bombed Dubai, Riyadh?

Like, why Why are they Why are they bombing other Arab states,

especially without the kind of the the US base?

Like, I get that, but I'm hearing about the Dubai airport being hit.

Like, what's that?

Why would they do that?

Just now, the Dubai airport looks like it was hit.

And I mean, clearly

And some of the tele- I'm not surprised

that they sent missiles

and drones into the Gulf states,

but I would have expected, as we saw after the 12-day war,

um that the attacks would have been against um American bases there,

as we saw in Qatar.

Um and, you know, maybe they fail, uh maybe they get knocked down,

maybe in the process of getting knocked down,

those Iranian weapons or the air defense, the missile defense,

ends up hitting other targets.

That can certainly happen, but that's not what we're seeing.

We're already seeing um drones that are directly targeting civilian areas in Dubai,

in Kuwait, in Saudi Arabia.

That that I have to tell you

that we've not seen

that before from Iran.

So, why would they do that?

Well, I mean, on the one hand,

these countries are seen by Iran as belligerents.

They are in principle neutral.

They've not joined the fight with the United States and Israel,

but they didn't prevent it.

Over the past couple weeks,

they increasingly went from opposing it to quietly saying

that they would provide support for the United States

and Israel um in in helping facilitate strikes.

So, I mean, Iran now, I think,

accurately sees them as hostile uh to to Iran's uh survival.

I I think Iran, if you are a leader in Iran today,

you recognize that you may not belong for this world.

There is an active attempt to assassinate every decision-maker,

active top-level decision-maker that is still alive in Iran today,

which is a staggering thing to say.

And so, um they may not be acting quite as rationally.

They may not be thinking quite as long-term.

And they also can't communicate very well.

So, this to me feels like desperation.

If you know that anything you do against hardened facilities,

like bases or like critical energy infrastructure, is likely to be shot down,

and you want to show that you can do something,

that you're not going to just sit and take it,

that there will be costs and consequences, that that is, you know,

perhaps the logic that leads you to engage in those strikes against civilian targets

um among countries that are presently non-combatants.

That that's the only logic I can come up with.

I don't believe these are rogue actions by missile

and operators and drone operators in Iran

that are not getting orders from anyone.

I don't believe that.

I think there's still sufficient centralized control.

All right, let's talk about the response from around the world.

So, I tell us about tell us about your dealings with the Europeans on

this.

I I saw I saw some pretty funny interactions that you had had.

The Europeans are talking about convening on Monday.

Today is Saturday.

This does feel like something that maybe would bring, you know,

bring bring come to the top of your attention,

but what are the Europeans doing?

They're basically acting concerned.

Um you know, it's kind of like they'll write a strong letter.

They're not really relevant here.

And that that doesn't mean they're not relevant on anything.

I mean, we saw that when Trump threatened them on Greenland,

they they said that they were going to hit back with reciprocal tariffs.

And they were going to hit back um with the anti-coercion instrument,

and Trump backed down.

He backed down without getting anything.

So, it's not as if the Europeans are uniquely factless on everything.

But on this issue, Trump made his decision,

and he wasn't taking any advice from the Europeans.

Um he was not asking them to join.

They are functionally irrelevant to American military decision-making vis-à-vis Iran.

And that is an uncomfortable position for the Europeans to be in.

And so, if you're Ursula von der Leyen,

and you say you're going to convene a council to discuss it on Monday,

you're going to have probably just about

as much effect on Monday

as you did on Saturday.

Now, I I would have I would have displayed more urgency.

Um the Brits did a bit of that in saying, you know,

that we got to you know, planes in the air,

and we want to make sure

that we're part of a collective defense you know of our allies in the

region so there could have been

that they could have done

that that would have been an important thing to do secondarily there are lots

of European citizens on the ground

and so they obviously want to make sure

that they are you know taking care they're all secure

that they're you know evacuating

as best as they possibly can you know all of these sorts of things

but they don't really have a collective position on Iran they don't have anything

that they can functionally do to change the trajectory of this conflict

and unlike in Iraq unlike in Afghanistan they're not actually playing a role there

is no coalition of the willing here

so the Europeans are irrelevant to this outcome

and and more broadly there is the reality

that the Chinese are irrelevant to this outcome the Russians Iran has no friends

externally you know we've seen since October 7th

that Israel and the United States have been able to target whether it's the

Houthis in Yemen or whether it's Hezbollah

or whether it's Iran last year

or just now or whether it's Hamas in Gaza in all of these cases

the Israelis and the Americans on occasion have engaged in military strikes

and there's been really no effective response whatsoever either by Iran

and its proxies the so-called axis of resistance

or their friends and supporters around the world whether it's global South countries

that really oppose the United States

or it's the Russians who have been working with Iran closely to get more

support for drones to help them fight against Ukraine in the war

that they started four years ago the Russians

or whether it's China

that buys a lot of oil from Iran Um,

I mean they've all expressed criticism.

It is uh, you know, we've got right now we've got a secure,

as you and I are talking,

there is a Security Council emergency session

that is going on

and I am quite certain

that the Chinese and Russians are expressing uh,

their uh, disagreement uh, with what has been uh,

ordered by the US and by Israel.

But they're not prepared to do anything.

In fact, I don't even believe that the Chinese will postpone the upcoming um,

summit meeting of President Trump to visit Beijing in April on the back of

these strikes.

There's really virtually nothing

that anyone is doing

as a consequence of the Americans

and the Israelis establishing military dominance against Iran

and in the region.

And that's wildly different than the first year of Trump's second administration

when he focused primarily on tariffs

and economic tools and where many countries around the world were very capable of

hitting back and not just capitulating

and actively negotiating but also using their own coercive tools

and mechanisms and getting to a place

that they felt um,

was better than what they were initially being demanded.

That is not the case militarily uh,

it either in Venezuela or in Iran um,

or I suspect in Cuba going forward.

And where else might President Trump decide

that he really likes taking unilateral military action

that no one is willing

or capable to respond against.

Um, how does that play though with MAGA?

How does that play with people who really didn't want America to get involved?

Is the fact that he manages to make this kind of short, sharp,

it of in invasions and that's no boots on the ground.

Is that kind of the way that Trump skirts round that?

Cuz it feels like in the last presidential campaign,

he actually campaigned on not starting wars

and instead that really has not been the case,

although of course the definition of war is is a little different

if there aren't actually soldiers

and troops on the ground.

Right.

I mean, if no American soldiers are getting killed,

um then it's a much easier proposition for him to square with his MAGA

supporters.

Um and in Venezuela, knock on wood,

no American uh servicemen and women uh have been have been killed.

There were a few injuries, uh but no one was killed.

And so far, again, early hours, no Americans have been killed.

But, you know, uh certainly Trump is prepared for Americans to be killed,

combatants and and quite plausibly non-combatants on the back of this.

And and large numbers of Americans killed

because of a war of choice in Iran will be unpopular with significant numbers

of Trump's MAGA base.

There's also uh there is a break in MAGA on Israel.

Um there are a number of strong MAGA supporters,

and you've seen this with Tucker Carlson in particular,

but there have been others that have been out there publicly saying, absolutely not.

Uh why why are we carrying so much water for Israel?

Why are we providing them billions and billions of dollars in military support?

Uh why why are we engaging in military actions

that are supporting what they want in their backyard?

I mean, on Ukraine, the United States has stopped providing military aid.

Why?

Because it's far away and we think the Europeans should do it.

So, why are we supporting Israel?

And and there's a lot of MAGA supporters that don't like that.

There are a lot of MAGA supporters that do.

Um and there are a lot of MAGA donors that do.

I mean, Miriam Adelson in particular,

but there are many uh

and then many that go to Mar-a-Lago all the time just

as there are those

that support military operations in Venezuela

and Cuba among the Miami exile community.

Um, but but it is not uniquely popular.

And here there's a broader we should address the broader issue.

Which is because you asked me, you know,

how is Trump dealing with the fact that um he made these promises,

he campaigned on this stuff.

And there were so many people pro-MAGA

that were saying that you know Kamala Harris was going to be the war

candidate,

but Trump wouldn't.

Trump's not a hawk.

Um and Charlie Kirk, I mean, you know, he was assassinated before that.

He was extremely opposed to the idea of attacking um Iran

and is on record in doing

so and I'm sure

that there are many opponents to Trump including some in MAGA

that are going to be using

that.

Now, Trump has made good on a number of his promises.

He promised that he was going to use tariffs

and he was going to work to bring manufacturing back to the US

and force other countries to spend money in the US

and he's cut a bunch of deals with promises from the Japanese

and the South Koreans

and the UK and the Europeans

and the Saudis and others to start spending a lot more money in the

US.

So he's whether you like the policy or not,

whether you think tariffs are good idea

or not and certainly doesn't affordability problem on the back of it.

He's made good on that.

He promised he was going to close the border

and he has done a lot of work in closing the border.

He promised he was going to you know, fight fentanyl.

He's done a lot of work in fighting fentanyl.

The Mexicans have been very very significant partners of the US on that.

But he also promised that he was going to America first and these wars.

And while there are no troops on the ground,

it is now clear

that unilateral American military power is being used to project outcomes

that he wants that a lot of MAGA's clearly uncomfortable with,

especially in the Middle East.

It's also clear that the Epstein files, where Trump said,

"I'm going to clean this place up."

And and we're going to release those files,

um because there's a two-tier justice system.

And and yet, you know,

Bill and Hillary Clinton will be brought in to testify, but not Howard Lutnick.

And so, he's protecting his own.

Um and and everyone sees that.

Um and and he he said he was going to drain the swamp.

He doesn't talk about that anymore.

In fact, it turns out not only was there a lot of corruption in

the US um under previous administrations,

but it's even more corrupt now under under Trump.

It's kleptocratic, benefiting him and his family directly,

and many insiders in the administration and their families.

So, I do think that the fact that Trump now,

on a number of issues,

has absolutely not uh followed through on promises that matter deeply to MAGA,

are are why he is hemorrhaging support, and why he is very likely,

overwhelmingly likely, to lose the house, probably by a substantial margin, in November.

And and that's be- he's running out of time.

It's it's getting harder for him to turn that around every day.

And I don't think

that unilateral strikes on Iran with Israel um are are going to change

that.

Uh I don't think the Supreme Court's ruling on AIPA is going to change

that.

I don't think that uh the Minneapolis um ICE efforts are going to change

that.

I I I think

that um he's in more trouble uh over the last couple months.

The trajectory has been negative for him,

and he's likely to become much more risk acceptant as a consequence of that,

which may well play out in other military episodes internationally.

But why?

I mean, why would why

if things are going badly

and your numbers are down,

do you I mean, I understand why you become more risk acceptant,

but actually leaning in to doing even more reckless things feels like maybe the

wrong direction to head in.

It it is something he can do.

It's it's power that he has.

He is If he were listening to his top advisers,

he would be acting very differently.

I think the the Venezuelan issue he would have handled very similarly.

But I mean, you know, the IEPA tariffs,

he was told by his Secretary of Treasury and by his US trade rep,

"Don't use this.

It won't stand up."

And he obviously knows better than they do because he's the president.

He's the one that won.

And so he went ahead and he did it.

And then a year later, less than a year later, the Supreme Court,

including his own nominees, vote against him.

And now it's going to be harder for him.

Now he's going to be more constrained.

So I mean, I think the problem is that Trump is very short-term.

He's very, you know, attached to the latest shiny object.

He constantly wants to make headlines.

And he's incredibly undisciplined.

So he does not have the temperament to engage in the strategic political revolution

that would allow him to to more effectively build a presidency

that is sits above checks

and balances.

I I think what we're finding is increasingly he's failing on a bunch of

issues.

And as a consequence, you start to see,

whether it's justices or whether it's members of the military

or whether it's Republican leaders,

start to take public steps against him.

And that wasn't happening 3 months ago, 6 months ago, but now it is.

We we've seen it um,

on a number of occasions

and I think we're going to see more of it going forward.

But I think it's also true, isn't it,

that some of the people who've been giving him advice, particularly on this war,

some of his military advisers, actually then got cast out.

You >> Got cast out, that's right.

Right.

So, does he really he really believes

that he can kind of do this

because he's the president,

he can just do this all by himself?

Well, these are relatively junior people, most of them, most of them,

because keep in mind that what Trump has hired for this time around,

some of his advisers are very capable, in my estimation, uh,

like Marco Rubio and Jameson Greer.

Some of them are incredibly incompetent, in my estimation, like Pete Hegseth, for example,

uh, or RFK, uh, but they all are incredibly loyal.

So, unlike Trump's first year in his first term of office,

where it was a revolving door with a lot of people

that then were talking,

were leaking, were extremely opposed to Trump, this time around,

we've seen virtually none of that.

And it's been a relatively tight ship,

because they all recognize that they're going to do exactly what Trump wants,

or else.

I mean, the only major blowup we've seen in the first year now of

the administration,

year plus, was Elon Musk, who came out in spectacular fashion, and, you know,

dished on the Epstein files,

and said he was going to create a third party, and all of that.

Basically, grabbed onto the third rail, but backed away from it.

J.D.

Vance facilitated a rapprochement, and now he's working with Trump again.

So, I mean, really, there's been, at the top level,

there's been continued alignment

and willingness to go along with whatever Trump is saying among

that inner circle.

And and that that willingness to facilitate, even things that fail.

So, I mean, again,

we've seen how many instances now where Trump has gone after,

launched lawsuits on the six Democrats, um, that did this video um,

that opposed him and you know

that lawsuit blew up

and you know he failed

and because he wasn't listening to advisors

and same thing with the lawsuit against James Comey

and Letitia James and he failed

and wasn't listening to advisors

but they are willing to do whatever he says in all of these instances

whether it's about military strikes

or economic terrorists or about taking efforts to ensure

that the next election is not quote-unquote rigged like the FBI investigation

and the seizing of the ballot boxes in Fulton County in Georgia all of

these are unprecedented acts

but they're unprecedented acts

that President Trump is ordering

and that his inner circle his direct reports

and his cabinet are 100% support not even not not a an inch of

space between Trump and those people.

All right, let's head back to the Middle East

and you mentioned earlier the idea of asymmetric warfare.

So if Iran has used up its missile you know Armory

but the reality is

that no one can actually dictate what happens with asymmetric warfare.

What do you think happening for instance with the Houthis

or with the Straits of Hormuz is

that going to get closed like what do you think is going to happen

at the what are the ripple effects of this I guess in the region?

Yeah, that's the most significant market impact

and and it might be the most significant vulnerability

that that American servicemen

and women have is is to the ships both tanker traffic directly

and military ships going through the Straits of Hormuz in the Red Sea

and more broadly and the Houthis have shown

that they have a capacity to make strikes against these boats including like off

the Horn of Africa in the Indian Ocean even more broadly.

So, I mean I do think

that there is a pretty high likelihood

that for at least a period of time

that the Straits of Hormuz will be impassable

and that means that oil prices

which have already spiked on these strikes

and in anticipation of these strikes with with lots of oil on the market

right now and with relatively low demand for oil.

Those prices are going up.

Natural gas, same thing.

You're going to have difficulty in getting

that gas to Europe

and that means that those prices are going up.

Huge amount of American military capability, minesweepers, the rest.

So, I mean I don't believe that the Straits will be impassable for long.

I'd be surprised if it was more than a matter of you know inside

a few days,

outside a couple weeks.

I'd be surprised if it went longer than that.

But there'll be continual threat to tankers

and that means that a lot of those tankers may end up having to

go the long way

and costing an awful lot more money

as a consequence.

All right.

So, in to wrap this up,

I'm curious what you're watching most closely in the next few days

and over the next few weeks.

Most closely I'm watching internally Iran.

I want to see what kind of demonstrations we see,

what kind of instability

and how much of

that gets out vis-a-vis Telegram

and other sources because not like there's an open media

that can actually report on it.

Do we see some towns that are farther away, you know,

Tehran away from Tehran where you have ethnic minorities for example where you know,

it's harder where there are Kurds Uh,

there are others that it's much harder for the Iranian central government to actually

have complete control.

We've seen with the green revolution before there were much bigger demonstrations

and a lot of violence outside of Tehran.

That would be interesting to watch, uh, for example.

As well as we want to see what kind of statements are being made

by the Iranian leadership

and who's making them

so far.

I mean, early hours we've not we've seen very little.

We've seen fog of war and the foreign minister make some statements,

but that's about it.

So, I mean, you know, really it is early days.

You want to see what's left of the Iranian regime

and what kind of opposition you see internally.

More broadly than that, uh, we want to see, uh,

what kind of reaction we get across the region.

Do we see, uh, effective, um, activity, uh, by the Houthis in Yemen?

Um, do we see terrorist activity, um, that, um,

that leads to bigger strikes against civilians?

Um, uh, you know,

do we see a front

that the the Hezbollah Lebanon front open up completely uh,

with Israel deciding that this is a great opportunity just mop that up, um,

after only limited strikes over the past months?

That's certainly very plausible in this environment.

Um, so lots lots of things to watch, um, but, uh,

but again in an environment where it's hard to imagine major escalation.

This is not going to become a regional war.

This is certainly not going to become World War III.

It's much more about what happens on the ground frankly in Iran.

That is the biggest thing we're looking at.

And in that regard very similar to right after Maduro was captured,

what we were watching what was what was happening on the ground in Caracas

and across Venezuela.

There's a lot more uncertainty for Iran than there is for Venezuela,

but the basic sorts of questions are actually very similar.

And thank you so much for unlike the Europeans taking time on your Saturday

to come and talk about this.

We are so grateful to have your wisdom

and thank you for tracking all of this.

We will I'm sure see you again soon.

Always great to talk to you.